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ABSTRACT As environmental goods such as fuelwood and fodder become more
scarce, rural households in developing countries spend more time in their collection. It
has been suggested that as a result households may reallocate labor away from own-
farm agricultural production. This paper examines whether this is the case for a sample
of agricultural households from rural Nepal. Cross-sectional estimates of agricultural
labor demand equations give some indication that reallocation away from farm work
may occur as environmental products become more scarce. However, these results dis-
appear in random-effects estimation suggesting that time is instead reallocated from
other activities or leisure. What little evidence there is for a labor reallocation from agri-
culture suggests that policies to relieve environmental good collection labor burdens
should focus on leaf fodder and grass used as livestock feed rather than on fuelwood.
1. Introduction
There has long been considerable interest in the relationship between agri-
culture and the natural environment in developing countries. Much of the
work exploring this relationship has tended to concentrate on natural
resources as inputs to the agricultural production process. In one recent
work, for example, Lopez (1997) tests and supports the hypothesis that
natural biomass is an important factor of agricultural production in Ghana.
In that case, biomass on fallow land provides soil nutrients and helps
prevent erosion. In Nepal, the country of focus for this paper, studies of
subsistence agricultural systems have emphasized the link between the
use of forest products such as leaf fodder and agricultural production (see,
e.g., Shroeder (1985), Bluffstone (1993, 1995), and Pradhan and Parks
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(1995)). Forest products become an input to agricultural production when
they are fed to livestock which produce manure for fertilizer. This paper
explores another possible link between forest products and agriculture.
Natural resources, or more accurately their scarcity, may impact house-
hold-level agriculture by influencing the allocation of other factors of
production, namely labor.
Rural households in developing countries typically rely heavily on self-
collected environmental products such as fuelwood and leaf fodder to
meet daily fuel and livestock feed requirements. When these products
become more costly for households to collect due, for example, to the
degradation of the natural environment, households spend more time in
their collection. One possible result is the reallocation of labor time from
other productive activities such as own-farm agricultural work to collec-
tion activities. This is thought particularly to be the case for women’s time,
since women are usually the primary collectors of environmental prod-
ucts.1 However, there has been very little formal economic analysis of this
link between the environment and agriculture despite its potentially
serious consequences for subsistence level agriculturalists. Notable excep-
tions are Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988) and Bluffstone (1993, 1995).
Using household data from the middle hills of Nepal, this paper
examines whether households that have higher costs of collecting
environmental products devote less time to own-farm agricultural activi-
ties. This is a particularly pertinent question for the Nepal hills where
agriculture is very labor intensive. Own-farm agriculture is the main
source of food for hill households, and the caloric intake of the rural popu-
lation in Nepal is generally low. These conditions emphasize the
importance of understanding the factors which influence agricultural pro-
duction in the region. Reductions in agricultural output stemming from
less labor input are very likely to have detrimental health consequences.
In previous work with the same sample of Nepali households, Cooke
(1998) shows that households allocate more time to collection activities
when environmental products are more costly. As in this paper, house-
hold-specific shadow prices for the products measure the costliness of the
products to a household and are assumed to increase with environmental
degradation. The time spent collecting fuelwood, leaf fodder, and cut grass
is found to increase significantly when household shadow prices for these
products increased. For example, a shadow price increase of one rupee per
10 kilograms of fuelwood (about a 66 per cent increase) is found to increase
household collection time by nearly one hour per day, mostly of women’s
time.2 It is clear that this time must be reallocated from some other activity.
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1 Cecelski (1987); Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988); Cleaver (1992), Thapa, Bilsborrow,
and Murphy (1995). See also Agarwal (1986); Dankelman and Davidson (1988);
and Dasgupta (1993), chapter 10 for discussions of women and environmental
good collection.
2 Cooke (1998), table 2c. Although not included in Cooke (1998), an increase in the
shadow price of water also significantly increases collection time, particularly that
of women. The water shadow price is included in the present analysis along with
those for fuelwood, cut grass, and leaf fodder.
The question addressed here is whether it comes at the expense of own-
farm agricultural labor. Empirical evidence of such a labor allocation link
between the natural resource base and agriculture would highlight the
serious consequences of environmental degradation for subsistence level
agriculturalists, and would perhaps increase the perceived benefits of poli-
cies to improve forest resources.
Analysis of this issue must take two important factors into account. One
is the gender component of labor reallocation decisions. Women play an
extremely important role in Nepali hill agriculture.3 They also do most of
the environmental good collection in Nepali households (see table 1), and
according to Cooke (1998) they account for over 80 per cent of the
increased collection time when environmental products become more
costly. Therefore we would expect the allocation of female labor to agri-
culture to be more sensitive to environmental good scarcity than that of
males. A second important factor is seasonality. It is shown in Cooke
(1998) that the time allocated to collection activities varies significantly
between seasons. This is also the case with time allocation to agriculture.
Household shadow prices for self-collected environmental products will
vary across seasons as well due to changes in product availability and col-
lection conditions. Thus, using yearly cross-sectional results alone may
obscure significant seasonal differences in labor allocation responses to
higher environmental good shadow prices.
The Nepal Energy and Nutrition (NENS) data set used for the empirical
analysis in this paper contains time allocation data which allow estimation
of own-household agricultural labor demand equations for men and
women.4 It also contains four quarterly rounds of data collected over a one
year period. To try to account for the impact of seasonality on household
labor allocation decisions, labor demand equations are estimated not only
with a cross-section of data aggregated to the yearly level, but also with
the data set broken down into its four component quarters. Using the
quarterly observations, cross-sectional demands are estimated separately
for the monsoon and dry seasons. Finally, the demands are estimated
using random-effects to take advantage of the panel aspects of the data.
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework for deriving household
labor demand functions and shadow prices for environmental goods.
Section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy for estimation of the
demand functions. Estimation results are discussed in section 4, and
section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical framework
The basis for the theoretical framework of this study is a neo-classical
model of agricultural household production as described in Singh, Squire,
and Strauss (1986). In the case presented here, markets for some of the
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systems.
4 Nepal Energy and Nutrition Survey, 1982/1983, Western Region, Nepal. Nepal
Agricultural Projects Service Center, the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, and the International Food Policy Research Institute.
goods in the model do not exist and the goods must be produced by the
household.5 The model begins with a representative household which is
assumed to maximize its quasi-concave utility function myopically in each
period. Here, each season is considered to be a separate period. To reduce
clutter, time subscripts are suppressed for the discussion of the model. The
utility function for each period may be written
U 5 U(X, M; D) (1)
where M is the household’s consumption of meals and X is its consump-
tion of a vector of market goods. Household utility is assumed to be
conditioned on a vector of fixed household characteristics, D, including
size, ethnic background, and educational level which may affect prefer-
ences. The household purchases X at market price Px, however meals are
assumed only to be available from home production.
Households maximize their utility function subject to a set of produc-
tion, budget, and time constraints. As with the utility function, these
constraints are given for each period. The production constraint for meals
is given by
M 5 M(Twm, Em, GH) (2)
and is concave in all its arguments. Twm is the time household women
spend in meal preparation, Em, is a vector of environmental goods used as
inputs to the meal production process, and GH is a vector of agricultural
goods also used in producing meals. For example, Em contains water and
fuelwood which is used as cooking fuel, and GH contains household con-
sumption of products such as rice and maize. Agricultural goods may be
bought in the market place at price Pg or may be produced by the house-
hold. Environmental goods are assumed only to be available from home
production (see below).
The household’s concave agricultural production function is given by
G 5 G[Twg, T
hw
g, T
m
g, T
hm
g, N, K, Eg] (3)
which is assumed to be concave and increasing in all its arguments. G is
the production of crops which may be sold or consumed by the household.
Agricultural labor used on a household’s farm comes from own-household
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5 This household decision problem is described in Cooke (1998). This model also is
similar to that presented in Bluffstone (1995). Bluffstone’s work models the agri-
culture–forest relationship in rural Nepal and presents simulations that test for
the effect of labor market conditions on the deforesting behavior of smallholder
agricultural households. His household model incorporates household time
devoted to fuelwood and fodder collection, agriculture, and off-farm wage labor.
Bluffstone concentrates on the deforesting aspects of household labor allocation in
his analysis, and abstracts to one six-month maize cultivation season for his simu-
lations. This paper, particularly since it uses the same NENS data used by
Bluffstone for his simulations, complements Bluffstone’s work by focusing on
agricultural labor, explicitly incorporating gender and seasonal factors, and
relying on cross-sectional and panel data econometric estimation to glean further
insights.
female labor, Twg, hired female labor, T
hw
g, own-household male labor,
Tmg, and hired male labor, T
hm
g. Production also depends on the amount of
land a household has available to use, K, livestock holdings, N, and
environmental goods that are inputs to the agricultural process, Eg.
Landholdings are assumed to be exogenous in this model. Livestock hold-
ings include male and female cattle and buffaloes and are also taken to be
exogenous. Livestock contribute to agricultural production primarily by
providing manure which is usually the only fertilizer used in the region.
Additionally, some of the livestock are used as draught animals. Eg con-
tains goods such as leaf fodder and cut grass which are fed to livestock,
and thus contribute to fertilizer production.
The production functions for Em and Eg are given by
Em 5 Em(T
w
me, T
m
me, A, D) (4)
and
Eg 5 Eg(T
w
ge, T
m
ge, A, D) (5)
These production functions differ only in the time variables for environ-
mental good collection, subscripted ‘me’ and ‘ge’ for time devoted to
meal-related environmental goods and agriculturally related environ-
mental goods respectively. In this formulation both male and female time
are spent in environmental good collection although they are not con-
sidered perfect substitutes. Both production functions are assumed to be
linear functions of the time inputs implying constant marginal products
for male and female labor for a given household in a given time period.
The vector of household characteristics, D, and the state of the environ-
ment a household faces, A, will also influence the production of both types
of environmental goods. For example, households comprised of elderly
members may have lower marginal products as will households in
locations where forest resources are more degraded. Since D and A will
differ across households, marginal products of labor will differ across
households as well.
The household time constraints are given in equations (6) and (7). Both
men and women are assumed to have a fixed endowment of available
work time given by Tm and Tw respectively. Women use this time for
preparing meals, collecting environmental goods used in meal and agri-
cultural production, own-farm agricultural labor, and wage labor
(subscripted m, me, ge, g, and L respectively). Men are assumed to split
their time between agricultural work on their own farm, collecting both
types of environmental goods, and wage labor
Tw 5 Twm 1 T
w
me 1 T
w
ge 1 T
w
g 1T
w
L (6)
Tm 5 Tmg 1 T
m
me 1 T
m
ge 1 T
m
L (7)
Equation (4) gives the household’s budget constraint. Household pur-
chases of X at market price Px are constrained by the amount of exogenous
income Y a household receives, and its net earnings from selling agricul-
tural products and labor. It is assumed that environmental goods are not
bought and sold and are consequently only available from household pro-
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duction. This corresponds to the actual situation in the survey area during
the early 1980s; there was very little trading of fuelwood and practically no
trading of leaf fodder.6 A household may buy and sell agricultural prod-
ucts at the price Pg. For the purposes of this model, agricultural products
and other market goods X are assumed to be available in perfectly func-
tioning competitive markets. It may also buy and/or sell male and female
labor in competitive markets at wage rates Wm and Ww respectively. This
assumption implies perfect substitutability between own-farm and hired
male labor and between own-farm and hired female labor. It also implies
that labor market opportunities are assumed to exist for both men and
women. This is not an unreasonable assumption given the extent of the
labor traded in the sampled villages. Although only about 25 per cent of
the households in the sample used in this paper report women working for
wages, almost all households hire female labor. Only one household in the
sample appears to have no tie to the female labor market. About half of the
sample households report men working for wages, and every household
either hires or sells male labor
Pg(G2GH) 1 W
m(Tm L 2 T
hm
g) 1 W
w(Tw L2 T
hw
g) 1 Y 5 PxX (8)
Substituting the production functions and time constraints into the
budget constraint or into the utility function, the Lagrangian function for
the household’s maximization problem may be written
Max + 5 U{X, M[Twm, Em(T
w
me, T
m
me, A, D), GH]; D} (9)
1 l{Pg*[G(T
w
g, T
hw
g, T
m
g, T
hm
g, K, N, Eg(T
w
ge, T
m
ge, A, D)) 2 GH]
1 Wm*(Tm 2 Tmg 2 T
m
me 2 T
m
ge 2 T
hm
g)
1 Ww*(Tw 2 Twg 2 T
w
ge 2 T
w
m 2 T
w
me 2 T
hw
g) 1 Y 2 PxX }
with the household choosing X, GH, and all time inputs. Assuming an
interior solution, the first-order conditions may be derived and solved sim-
ultaneously for a set of reduced-form demand equations. One may also
obtain derived demands for Eg and Em. All demands will be functions of
the exogenous variables (Ww, Wm, Pg, Px, K, N, A, D, Y) and the shadow
prices. The shadow prices themselves are functions of the exogenous vari-
ables and the quantity of the environmental product a household chooses
to use (that quantity being determined here by the amount of time a house-
hold chooses to spend collecting the good).
The first-order conditions may be arranged to give
(Ww/ETWme )/Pg 5 (W
m/ETMme )/Pg 5 UM ME m/UM MGH (10)
from which we may define the shadow price for meal-related environ-
mental goods
PE m 5 (W
w/ETWme ) 5 (W
m/ETMme) (11)
The terms ETWme and ETMme are the marginal products of the time spent in
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6 Personal communications with Shubh Kumar of IFPRI (1996) and with Madhav
Gautam, Nepal coordinator for the NENS survey (1997).
meal-related environmental good collection by women and men respect-
ively. The shadow price PE m is defined as the women’s wage rate divided
by the marginal product of women’s labor in the meal-related environ-
mental good production or as the men’s wage rate divided by the male
marginal product of labor. Equation (10) simply gives the condition that a
household will consume Em and GH until the ratio of their ‘prices’ equals
the ratio of the marginal utilities the household receives from an additional
unit of them. Of course, PE m is not a market price, but a shadow price that
is determined endogenously by the household’s choices. Specifically, it
will depend on household preferences over meals. Since these preferences
will vary from household to household, so will this shadow price.7
The first-order conditions also yield the similarly defined shadow price
for environmental goods used in agriculture
P Eg 5 (W
w/ETWge ) 5 (W
m/ETMge ) 5 GEg Pg (12)
Here, ETWge (ETMge) is the marginal product of women’s (men’s) labor in
agricultural-type environmental good production and GEg is the marginal
product of Eg in agricultural production. This shadow price, PE g , will
depend on a household’s agricultural technology as well as household
preferences, and a household will equate this shadow price to the value of
the marginal product of Eg.
Shadow prices are assumed to reflect the relative economic cost of
environmental products to a household. Controlling for endogenous pro-
ductivity factors, this cost is largely determined by the environmental
conditions a household faces. These conditions include distance to the
source, steepness of terrain, and the level of environmental degradation. A
household living in relatively worse environmental conditions (e.g., more
degraded) will have to spend more time to collect a unit of the product
than will a household living in better environmental conditions. Hence,
households in worse environmental areas will tend to have higher shadow
prices. Obviously, shadow prices are also influenced by a household’s
wage rates. However, as is discussed more in the data section, wage rates
do not vary a great deal across the sample considered in this paper, and so
their influence in this case is minimal.
Shadow prices will vary between seasons. In the model presented here
agricultural and environmental good production functions are written
identically for each period. Obviously, production conditions and thus a
household’s productivity are likely to change over the course of a year. It
is much harder to produce fuelwood in the heavy monsoon season, for
example. Therefore the production functions in (3), (4), and (5) are
assumed to shift over seasons. This does not change the general interpret-
ation of the first-order conditions. However, a given household will have
differing values for its marginal products of labor at different times of the
year and, consequently, it’s shadow prices will vary as well. Shadow prices
for the NENS households do in fact show seasonal variation as is discussed
more in the data section.
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3. Data and empirical strategy
The data set used for this study is from the Nepal Energy and Nutrition
Survey, 1982/1983 (NENS) and contains four quarterly rounds collected
over a one-year period. The data as received by the author were at the
household level, no individual level data were reported. There are data for
118 households sampled from three village panchayats in three different
districts in the Western Development Region of Nepal’s middle hills.
Panchayats are local government units below the district level. Each pan-
chayat contains several wards which correspond closely to villages.
Approximately 20 households were randomly sampled from each of two
wards selected from each of the three sample panchayats. First panchayats
and then wards were chosen to obtain variation in market access, ethnicity,
altitude, and environmental degradation.8
The survey region consists of hills and valleys with the study house-
holds living between roughly 500 and 1500 meters. Ethnically, the sample
is comprised mostly of Hindu households of the Brahmin (high) caste,
although there are many Tibeto-Burman households as well. Brahmin
households have higher income and consumption per capita than other
sample households, and they tend to own more livestock due to religious
prescriptions. All sample households collect and use environmental prod-
ucts, and all of the households are agricultural. They all own at least some
land with a sample average of slightly less than 11⁄2 hectares per household.
This includes both upland area (pakho) found on hillsides, and lowland
area (khet) which is usually found in valley bottoms. Lowland may be irri-
gated. Sample households mainly grow wheat, rice, maize, and ragi (finger
millet), and most of them rely heavily on their own farm’s production for
their food consumption.
Collecting environmental products, engaging in own-farm agricultural
activities, and preparing food for consumption comprise a very large pro-
portion of a household’s available work time. Households collect
fuelwood, leaf fodder, cut grass, and water. Over the course of a year
households spend an average of almost eight hours per day collecting
these four environmental products, around ten hours per day in own-farm
agricultural labor, and over five hours per day in food preparation.
Women’s labor accounts for most of the time spent collecting environ-
mental products and preparing food, and slightly less than half of the
agricultural labor time. On average each adult woman in a household
spends about nine hours per day and each adult man spends slightly less
than five hours per day doing these three activities.
These yearly averages hide significant fluctuations in labor allocation
over different seasons. Table 1 presents data for household time allocation
for men, women, and youths age 6–15 by season for the year covered by
the Nepal Energy and Nutrition Survey. In this table own-farm agricul-
tural labor has been converted to hours per day from the eight-hour labor
day units reported in the NENS data. In the survey villages the monsoon
season runs from April to September with the July–September quarter
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8 See Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988) for more information on the survey design and
sampling strategy.
seeing the heaviest rains. The period from October through March is the
dry season. It may be noted that farm labor time and collection time both
vary considerably between seasons, although food preparation and
cooking time does not vary that much. Food preparation includes activities
such as milling, while cooking is the time spent preparing meals. Both men
and women spend more time collecting environmental products during
the monsoon season. This is largely attributable to spending more time
cutting grass which is only available at this time of year. Youths also spend
more time collecting during the monsoon, although the total times
reported here are rather small in comparison to the adult times. Youths are
usually responsible for grazing herd animals, and grazing time is not
included in this table.
Households use the four environmental goods considered in this study
mostly for fuel and for feeding livestock. Fuelwood is the primary cooking
fuel and is used both for family meal preparation and for cooking kundo, a
cooked gruel of oilseed cake, straw, and water which is fed to livestock.
The NENS data do not report how much fuelwood and water households
use for kundo preparation. None of the households use improved wood-
burning or commercial fuel stoves, found by Amacher, Hyde and Joshee
(1993) to be technological substitutes for fuelwood use, nor do they use
dung as fuel. Rural Nepali households often stall feed their livestock leaf
fodder and cut grass. Cut grass is considered a superior feed and is relied
on quite heavily during the rainy season. During the dry season when
grass is not available, households feed their animals more leaf fodder and
straw, and spend more time grazing them. The uses to which collected
water is put are not specified in the NENS data.
The model presented in the previous section implies a system of simul-
taneously derived household demand equations that are functions of all
exogenous variables and of the endogenous shadow prices. Although the
whole system of demand equations has been estimated, this paper reports
only a subset. Cooke (1998) shows that households spend more time col-
lecting environmental goods when their shadow prices increase. Of
particular interest here is whether this is achieved by reallocating labor
away from agricultural production activities. Since the focus of this paper
is on household labor allocation to own-farm agriculture, only the results
for labor input demands to own-farm agricultural work are presented.
Cross-sectional demands with data aggregated to the yearly level are
estimated with two stage least squares (2SLS) to control for the endo-
geneity of the shadow prices. Also, cross-sectional demands using 2SLS
are estimated for the rainy and dry seasons separately. In this case, each
season is assigned the two quarterly rounds of data which coincide with
the correct time of year, and a dummy variable is included for one of the
quarters. For many of the demands a Hausman specification test
(Hausman, 1978) could not reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of one
or more shadow prices. If the exogeneity of all shadow prices could not be
rejected, then OLS results corrected for heteroskedasticity are presented.
The quarterly observations of the NENS data allow the demand equa-
tions to be estimated using panel data techniques as well as cross-sectional
ones. Using panel techniques, equations are estimated for the panel con-
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taining all four quarters, and for the rainy and dry seasons separately.
Panel data estimation techniques are used to control for omitted variable
bias due to the exclusion of unobserved household level factors that are
correlated with the error terms of the estimated demand equations. This
should control for household productivity differences not already cap-
tured by the household composition variables. As discussed in Hsiao
(1986), the unobserved, household-specific effects may be modeled either
as being fixed or as occurring randomly in the sample population. For this
study, both fixed-effects and random-effects models are estimated and a
Hausman specification test is used to determine the correct specification.
The random-effects specification cannot be rejected, and so only the
random-effects results are presented in this paper.
Table 2 summarizes the dependent variables. The NENS data set pro-
vides the number of days of household male and household female labor
spent on seven principal crops farmed by households in the survey region.
This labor allocation data were collected by crop, not by quarter, and in
some cases a crop’s growing season spans two of the survey quarters. To
convert the crop-specific labor allocation data into quarterly figures the
time for each crop is assigned to the quarter which most accurately reflects
its growing season. The cropping calendar which was the basis for this
assignment is given in Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988, p. 21). In cases where
the growing season for a crop is relatively evenly split between two quar-
ters, the labor days for that crop are also split and assigned evenly between
those quarters.9 As seen in table 2, household labor allocation to agricul-
ture varies substantially across households as evidenced by high standard
deviations relative to the mean for both male and female labor.
Additionally, the standard deviation for male labor is high compared to
the mean labor supplied suggesting that many households have a very
high male labor input to own-farm agriculture.
The regressors corresponding to the exogenous and shadow price vari-
Environment and Development Economics 453
9 Combining the data into two periods, for the wet season and for the dry season,
avoids splitting labor days between periods in this fashion. The labor demand
equations were estimated with this two season model for comparison. Labor days
for maize and early paddy were dropped since their growing periods both start in
the dry season and end in the rainy season. Estimation results from the two season
model are very similar to those presented in this paper.
Table 2 Household labor to own-farm agriculture
Variable Units Mean Std.Dev
Total farm labor time man-days/year 444.6 452.0
Women’s farm labor time man-days/year 208.1 211.2
Men’s farm labor time man-days/year 234.8 270.0
Total farm labor time man-days/quarter* 111.3 141.9
Women’s farm labor time man-days/quarter* 52.2 65.2
Men’s farm labor time man-days/quarter* 58.7 86.7
Notes: *Average over all four quarters.
Source: Nepal Energy and Nutrition Survey, 1982/83.
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Table 3 Explanatory variables (yearly averages)
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
Fuelwood Rs/10 kgs 1.53 1.02
shadow price
Water shadow price Rs/10 trips 0.28 0.23
Grass shadow price Rs/10 kgs 0.66 0.78
Fodder shadow price Rs/10 kgs 0.63 0.91
Female wage rate imputed average daily wage rate 5.15 0.77
for household females
Male wage rate imputed average daily wage rate 11.19 3.04 
for household males
Male adults number of household males age 1.68 1.03
16–59
Female adults number of household females 1.70 0.96
age 16–59
Youths number of household children 1.64 1.30
ages 6–15
Children number of household children 1.34 1.13
under age 6
Adult literacy percentage of literate household 42.28 28.84
adults
Upland area hectares of upland area 0.83 0.72
owned by the household
Lowland area hectares of lowland area owned 0.62 0.57
by the household
Bovine number of cattle and buffaloes 5.58 4.01
Caste dummy Dummy 5 1 if household is 0.33 0.47
Tibeto-Burman and 0 otherwise
Location dummy Dummy = 1 if in Chhoprak 0.32 0.47
panchayat and 0 otherwise
Altitude meters 887.23 295.09
Remittances total amount of remittances to 1401.42 3127.77
the household, in rupees
Round 1 Dummy 5 1 if April–June 
(early monsoon)
Round 2* Dummy 5 1 if July–September 
(heavy monsoon)
Round 3 Dummy 5 1 if October–December 
(dry season)
Round 4 Dummy 5 1 if January–March 
(dry season)
Note: *The dummy variable for round 2 is dropped for estimation purposes in
the full panel of data.
Source: Nepal Energy and Nutrition Survey, 1982/83.
ables in the theoretical model are described in table 3. As discussed earlier,
not all households have men or women who report working for wages.
Thus, household-level average daily wage rates for men and women in
households that do have such data are used to impute average daily wage
rates for the entire sample. These wages are imputed using a Heckman
procedure to control for any selection bias.10 Shadow prices are then com-
puted using the imputed women’s wage rates from the Heckman
estimation. This is done by multiplying the imputed women’s wage rate
for a household (converted to rupees/hour) by the average time it takes the
household to collect 10 kilograms of the environmental product (which
corresponds to the inverse of the constant marginal product of labor).11
Imputed wage rates, collection times, and shadow prices are all household
specific. The formulation of the shadow prices using the imputed female
wage rate was chosen over a formulation using the imputed male wage
rate since women account for over 70 per cent of total household time
spent collecting the four environmental products considered in this paper.
Shadow prices measure the economic scarcity of environmental goods to
a household, and, correcting for household-level productivity differences,
may be taken to reflect environmental conditions. As noted before,
environmental conditions comprise a variety of factors including distance
to the forest, steepness of terrain, and seasonal conditions as well as level
of forest degradation. All of these factors vary across the households in the
NENS sample. Additionally, it should be noted that although some
environmental conditions and the shadow prices do vary quite a bit over
seasons, the one year of data in the NENS sample is not enough to assess
dynamic responses to environmental degradation which occurs over a
much longer period.
It is also worth noting that relative wage rates will also influence a
household’s shadow prices. Households with a high opportunity cost for
their time spent collecting will face higher shadow prices, everything else
held constant. Thus, the economic cost to a household of collecting a unit
of an environmental product is determined both by factors which influ-
ence collection productivity, and by the opportunity cost of the time spent
collecting as given by the wage rate. For this sample, the standard devia-
tion of the female imputed daily wage rate is relatively small and that of
the shadow prices relatively large, implying that much of the variation in
shadow prices across the sample comes from variation in per unit collec-
tion times. All equations in this paper have also been estimated using
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10 Heckman (1979). The null hypothesis of no selection bias could not be rejected in
either model. The econometric specification used is given in Cooke (1998),
appendix A.
11 Daily wage rates are converted to rupees/hour by assuming an eight-hour work
day. The choice of making the shadow prices rupees per 10 kilograms verses per
1 kilogram or 100 kilograms is arbitrary. It should be noted that a 1 rupee price
increase for any of the environmental goods considered is very large in percentage
terms. The data give the time per trip to collect water, not the time per water unit,
so the shadow price for water is given by rupees per ten trips. This may still func-
tion as a reasonable shadow price given the assumption that households collect
the same amount of water on each trip.
simply the time to collect 10 kilograms of a good (or time per trip in the
case of water) instead of the full shadow prices. The results are very similar
to those presented here.12
The amount of lowland area (khet) and upland area (pakho) a household
owns correspond to the variable K in the theoretical model. Altitude may
also account for differences in farming conditions. The number of cattle
and buffaloes a household owns measures livestock holdings N. Male
bovines are used as draught animals and females provide manure which
is used as fertilizer. Both male and female bovines are fed using environ-
mental products such as leaf fodder. Remittances are included as a
measure of a household’s non-wage exogenous income Y. The household
adult literacy rate, caste, and household composition variables belong to
the household characteristic vector D. The dummy variable for Chhoprak
panchayat serves as a rough proxy for the state of the environment variable,
A. Kumar and Hotchkiss (1988) report that this panchayat is in a much more
deforested area than the other survey sites. Of course, using this location
dummy will capture other panchayat-level characteristics as well.
Unfortunately, there is no exogenous measure of environmental con-
ditions in the NENS data which could otherwise be used.
Not every variable from the theoretical model can be included in the
empirical estimation due to data limitations. For one, the prices of agricul-
tural goods do not vary across the sample. The prices of other market
goods also are not included since they either are unavailable or do not vary
across the sample. Additionally, not all of the variables used in the yearly
cross-sectional regressions may be used in the regressions using quarterly
observations. Quarterly imputed wages are almost perfectly collinear with
the seasonal dummies and so are omitted. Remittances are not included
since there are no observations for the April–June quarter. A joint F-test for
the exclusion of the wage and remittance variables from the yearly cross-
sectional equations cannot reject (at the 5 per cent level) that they may be
dropped from the total own-farm labor and male own-farm labor equa-
tions. However, the F-test does reject dropping them from the female
own-farm labor equation at the 5 per cent level, although not at the 1 per
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12 The coefficients on the time per unit measures of environmental good scarcity
have the same sign, significance level, and order of magnitude as the coefficients
on the shadow prices. The exception to this is the coefficient for the ‘price’ of leaf
fodder in the dry season cross-sectional equations. The time per unit measure is
more significant in the total farm labor and male farm labor equations than the
shadow price coefficient (significant at the 5 per cent level as compared to the 10
per cent level). This difference does not hold in the random-effects estimates.
Given that there are not complete wage data and that the wages themselves show
little variation, it has been suggested that the results of the time per unit estima-
tion be reported in this paper instead of the shadow price results. This would
emphasize the variation in household costs due to environmental conditions.
However, in order to more clearly maintain the link between the theoretical and
empirical models I have chosen to present the shadow price estimates. The full
economic cost of environmental goods to a household influences household
decisions. In the case here, factors which affect household productivity such as
environmental conditions are the main cause of variation in the economic cost.
cent level. This indicates that comparisons of the cross-sectional results
including the variables with subsequent female labor equations should be
treated with a bit of caution.
Some variables are dropped in moving from cross-sectional to panel
estimation due to the nature of environmental good collection in the Nepal
Hills. In the random-effects model which covers all four quarters shadow
prices for leaf fodder and grass are excluded, since there are almost no
observations for them in the rainy and dry season quarters respectively.
This is due to the extreme seasonality of the use of these two types of feed;
in general, grass is not used in the dry season and leaf fodder is not used
in the rainy season. In the cross-sectional regressions, the shadow price of
cut grass is included in the rainy season equations, and the fodder shadow
price is included in the dry season equations. In the separate rainy and dry
season random-effects equations (each with two quarters) the shadow
prices are handled in similar fashion.
4. Empirical results
Table 4 indicates how the demand for own-household agricultural labor is
related to the shadow prices of fuelwood, water, cut grass, and leaf fodder.
The results are for labor demand equations estimated first using 2SLS on
cross-sectional data and then random-effects on panel data. Only the coef-
ficients on the shadow prices of the environmental goods are included in
table 4 since they are the main focus of this study. Full estimation results
may be found in the appendix.
The shadow price coefficients from cross-sectional estimation are pre-
sented in Table 4 under the columns ‘Yearly’, ‘Rainy’, and ‘Dry’. The
‘Yearly’ columns contain results for equations estimated with data aggre-
gated to the yearly level. The ‘Rainy’ and ‘Dry’ columns contain
cross-sectional estimates from equations using quarterly data for the rainy
and dry quarters respectively. The cut grass (leaf fodder) shadow price is
not included in the dry (rainy) season estimations, since it is not observable
for most households during this season.
The fourth column under each shadow price is labeled RE for random-
effects. Random-effects equations are estimated three different ways. In
one way all four quarters of data are used. The shadow prices of water and
fuelwood are included since they are used consistently throughout the
year and there are observations on these variables for all four quarters.
These are the results presented under the water and fuelwood price
columns. The random-effects models for the rainy and dry seasons are also
estimated separately using the quarters of data corresponding to each
season. These models include the cut grass or the leaf fodder shadow price,
whichever is appropriate for the season, as well as the shadow prices for
water and fuelwood. The random-effect coefficient estimates for the
shadow price of cut grass (rainy season) are presented in the grass price RE
column, and those for the shadow price of leaf fodder (dry season) are
shown in the fodder price RE column. Full results for all three random-
effects models are included in the appendix.
By estimating the three agricultural labor demand equations first using
cross-sectional data techniques and then using panel techniques, we may
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examine whether cross-sectional estimation results persist after correcting
for unobservable household effects. In Cooke (1998) higher shadow prices
were shown to significantly increase collection time using both cross-sec-
tional and panel data econometric models. If there is a time reallocation
away from agricultural labor as a result of increased collection time, then
it should be discernible in the random-effects estimates as well as in cross-
sectional ones. However, it appears from all of the results presented in
table 4 that there is relatively little labor reallocation away from agricul-
ture. There is almost no significant reduction in own-household
agricultural labor evident from the random-effects estimates, and very
little in the cross-sectional estimates.
The strongest negative result on any of the shadow prices is for the
fodder shadow price. The yearly cross-sectional results indicate that a
higher fodder shadow price significantly reduces male farm labor input.
However, fodder is collected primarily in the dry season, and these results
are much weaker in the dry season cross-sectional estimates and disappear
in the dry season random-effects estimates. The shadow price for cut grass
is significantly negative at the 10 per cent level in the rainy season
women’s labor equation. This result, albeit a weak one, persists in the
random-effects specification. Cut grass is only available during the
monsoon season, and during that time women spend an average of four
hours per day collecting it to stall feed livestock. Men collect grass in the
early monsoon season, but women account for most of the collection time
in the later monsoon season when agricultural labor requirements are
high. Thus, it is not surprising that this result is only significant for the
women’s labor equations.
Interestingly, the shadow price coefficients for fuelwood are not signifi-
cant in any of the regressions, although they are mostly negative. It
appears that the scarcity of environmental goods that are important
seasonal livestock feeds have more of a negative impact on household
farm labor allocation than does scarcity of fuelwood. This is not terribly
surprising when one considers the nature of collection of these goods.
Fuelwood is not collected everyday. It is possible to store fuelwood and,
therefore, it is possible to coordinate fuelwood collection times with
slacker agricultural times. Leaf fodder and cut grass, on the other hand, are
not stored, but are collected and fed to livestock on more of a daily basis.
One would thus expect a stronger effect on agricultural labor allocation
from the fodder and grass shadow prices than from the fuelwood shadow
price.
Perhaps the most striking results in table 4 are the coefficient estimates
on the water shadow price. Unlike the other three shadow prices, an
increase in the shadow price of water is associated with a significantly
higher labor allocation to agriculture. It is very difficult to explain this
result, particularly as it is robust to all of the econometric specifications.
The result indicates that there is some substitution of time into agricultural
labor when water is more costly. Although the NENS data do not specify
the specific uses to which collected water is put, it is not for irrigation pur-
poses making this all the more puzzling. Possibly this result is picking up
spatial aspects of household, agricultural field, and water source locations.
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This explanation is less convincing given that the water shadow price coef-
ficients are significantly positive in both random-effects and fixed-effects
estimates as well as cross-sectional ones. It is possible that the shadow
price variable is misspecified. It should be noted that the shadow price of
water is calculated using the ‘time per trip’ as opposed to a time per unit
of water collected. This may be an inferior measure which is introducing
some error into the estimation.
In addition to the environmental good shadow price coefficients in table
4, there are other results in the appendix tables that deserve discussion
here. The factors exerting the strongest influence on the amount of time
men and women spend in agricultural labor appear to be the amount of
land a household owns and the time of year. Neither of these are terribly
surprising, but they bear closer inspection. The number of children in a
household also turns out to be quite influential.
The amount of land a household owns significantly increases the time
men and women spend in agricultural labor. More interestingly, it appears
that upland area and lowland area influence labor allocation differently.
Owning more upland area significantly increases both male and female
labor input in all cross-sectional specifications, but female labor input
increases by a larger amount. Owning more lowland area only signifi-
cantly increases male labor input. A partial explanation for this latter result
is that most households in the sample irrigate their lowland area and main-
taining water flow tends to be a male task. A more direct explanation for
both upland and lowland coefficients is that on average men spend much
more time in padi production than women do (165 days/year for men
versus 95 days/year for women) and that women spend much more time
in ragi (finger millet) production than men (153 days/year for women
versus 111 days/year for men). Padi is a lowland crop and ragi is an
upland crop. The gender division of labor between these two crops prob-
ably accounts for the difference in male and female upland and lowland
coefficient estimates since men and women spend roughly the same
amount of time on the other crops.
Seasonality also has an extremely strong effect on agricultural labor allo-
cation. This is quite clear from the significance of included seasonal
dummy variables in both cross-sectional and random-effects models. Most
agricultural activity occurs during the height of the monsoon season and
the quarter after it. In the random-effects model with all four quarters,
male and female labor times are both significantly lower in the first and
fourth rounds (April–June and January–March) compared to the omitted,
heavy monsoon second round (July–September). In the rainy season cross-
sectional and random-effects models, the heavy monsoon seasonal
dummy is significantly positive compared to the early monsoon period for
all equations. The same is true of the early dry season dummy compared
to the late dry season period in all dry season models.
Finally, the number of young children in a household has a negative and
significant coefficient in almost all of the equations. Having an additional
small child tends to reduce the amount of time both men and women
spend in agricultural activities. This result is quite strong in the rainy
season random-effects model, and all but disappears in the dry season
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random-effects model. The monsoon season is a period of intense agricul-
tural activity. Labor constraints are likely to be tighter in this season, so
having to look after a small child is more likely to cut into agricultural
time. There may also be weather-related factors that make joint production
of child raising and agriculture less feasible in the monsoon season.
5. Conclusion
The relationship between rural agricultural households and the environ-
ment is a very close one in many developing countries. This paper has
examined one avenue by which scarcity of environmental resources can
influence household level agriculture in rural Nepal. Overall, the results of
this study give little clear support to the claim that households, and
women in particular, will spend less time farming when it becomes more
costly to collect environmental products such as fuelwood. Very few
shadow price coefficients are significantly negative in either the cross-sec-
tional or the random-effects labor demand equations. In fact, an increase in
the shadow price of water appears to actually increase a household’s agri-
cultural labor allocation. It appears that seasonal factors, household
landholdings, household composition, and traditional gender roles in agri-
culture exert more influence on household agricultural labor allocation
decisions than does an increase in the cost of collecting environmental
products.
Despite the lack of strong empirical evidence in the NENS data sup-
porting labor reductions to agriculture when faced with higher shadow
prices, it still remains that these households do reallocate their time when
environmental goods are more costly. Households in this sample spend
significantly more time collecting environmental products when shadow
prices are higher, and most of this time increase comes from women.13 The
results in this paper imply that most of the reallocated time must come
from another productive activity or from leisure. It is quite conceivable
that agriculture is such a high priority for these subsistence farmers that
sacrifices will be made in leisure or other less crucial activities before agri-
cultural labor time is reduced. Given this explanation, the fact that there is
any evidence at all of labor reallocation away from agriculture indicates
that the environmental goods are extremely important and have become
costly enough to significantly tighten household labor constraints.
An alternative, or complementary, explanation for the findings in this
paper is that the timing of agricultural and collection activities may be
such that agricultural labor reductions are not necessary. For example,
fuelwood is not collected every day. Indeed, it may be collected and stored
for some time before it is used. It is quite possible for households to do the
bulk of their fuelwood collection in the dry season which is an agricultur-
ally less intense time of year (although households do collect some
fuelwood in the monsoon season). This line of reasoning also helps explain
why the shadow prices of grass and fodder tend to be more significant
than that of fuelwood; fodder and grass are collected on more of a daily
basis and are not stored. Although fuelwood is a vitally important good for
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13 Cooke (1995, 1998).
rural Nepalis, this analysis indicates that the tightening of labor constraints
imposed by higher collection costs of leaf fodder and grass for livestock
feed may pose more of a problem for rural households. This would suggest
that policies geared toward relieving the burden of collection activities for
rural households, and for women in particular, should focus more on live-
stock feed issues than on fuelwood.
It should be noted that this paper does not claim that scarcity of environ-
mental goods will never lead households to reallocate time away from
agriculture, although it does seem clear that this would not be the first
response. In areas where environmental degradation is much more serious
than in the NENS villages such reallocation away from agriculture may
occur, particularly if there are few feasible substitutes for self-collected
environmental goods. Soussan et al. (1991), for example, describe villages
in the Dhanusha District of Nepal where women must make one or two
day trips to collect fuelwood because the forest has become increasingly
distant and degraded. It would seem that this level of scarcity would have
a stronger effect on household labor allocation decisions.
Still, one should realize that reallocating labor is only one method house-
holds have of dealing with environmental good scarcity, and it is likely to
be a short-run solution at best. If environmental goods continue to become
more and more costly to collect, at some point households will turn to
other methods of coping such as planting trees on their property. Some
households in the NENS sample have, in fact, begun planting fodder trees.
However, incentives to pursue this strategy may be limited if the trees
compete with agricultural crops. Understanding the conditions under
which rural households will pursue different coping strategies for environ-
mental good scarcity, and the impact of these strategies on agricultural
decisions, are important avenues for future research.
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Appendix
Yearly cross-sectional demands for household agricultural labor (days/year)
Male Female Total
Fuelwood shadow price 234.6 26.6 241.2
(1.6) (0.4) (1.3)
Water shadow price 36.7** 9.0 45.8**
(3.3) (1.6) (3.4)
Cut grass shadow price 21.2 22.5 23.7
(0.1) (0.3) (0.2)
Leaf fodder shadow price 241.4** 220.4 261.9**
(2.2) (1.4) (2.2)
Female daily wage rate 33.8 224.55 8.2
(0.8) (0.9) (0.1)
Male daily wage rate 97.0** 225.1 71.2
(2.0) (1.0) (1.2)
Location dummy 5 1 if Chhoprak 140.2** 260.0 80.4
(2.4) (21.5) (1.0)
Caste dummy 5 1 if Tibeto/Burman 2104.7 248.2 2153.8*
(1.4) (1.4) (1.8)
Upland area 200.1** 228.2** 428.3**
(8.7) (6.6) (8.5)
Lowland area 119.9** 14.6 134.1
(2.0) (0.4) (1.6)
Bovine livestock 210.4 20.3 210.8
(1.4) (0.07) (0.9)
Altitude 0.1 0.1 0.2
(1.1) (1.4) (1.5)
Percentage of literate adults 28.36* 3.4 24.8
(1.8) (1.4) (0.8)
Male adults 32.6 24.1 29.7
(1.1) (0.3) (0.9)
Female adults 21.9 29.7** 51.3
(1.5) (2.1) (2.0)
Youths age 6–15 17.2* 14.1* 31.5*
(1.7) (1.7) (1.9)
Children under age 6 252.2** 233.0** 285.5**
(3.5) (2.4) (3.5)
Annual remittances 0.003 0.01** 0.01**
(0.7) (3.2) (2.0)
Constant 21064.2* 178.5 2877.1
(1.8) (0.6) (1.2)
Number of observations 102 102 102
Adjusted R-square 0.66 0.72 0.75
Notes: *significant at the 10 per cent level, **significant at the 5 per cent level
(also in bold type).
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.
464 Priscilla A. Cooke
Rainy season cross-sectional demands for household agricultural labor (days/quarter)
Male Female Total
Fuelwood shadow price 20.6 -0.7 21.4
(0.5) (0.7) (0.7)
Water shadow price 4.8** 1.8 6.6**
(2.1) (1.3) (2.1)
Cut grass shadow price 27.7 212.8* 220.8
(0.9) (1.8) (1.5)
Location dummy 5 1 if Chhoprak 20.94 1.6 0.6
(0.1) (0.1) (0.04)
Caste dummy 5 1 if Tibeto/Burman 13.4 222.4* 236.3
(0.8) (1.7) (1.5)
Upland area 49.3** 54.7** 104.2**
(4.9) (5.8) (6.1)
Lowland Area 31.3 210.1 21.0
(1.6) (1.0) (0.8)
Bovine livestock 0.1 1.7 1.9
(0.07) (1.4) (0.5)
Altitude 20.009 0.04** 0.03
(0.4) (2.0) (0.9)
Percentage of literate adults 0.1 0.2** 0.4*
(0.8) (2.5) (1.8)
Male adults 6.3 1.0 7.3
(0.6) (0.2) (0.5)
Female adults 3.8 4.2* 8.0
(0.9) (1.1) (1.1)
Youths age 6–15 2.0 5.0 7.1
(0.9) (1.5) (1.6)
Children under age 6 29.9** 26.3* 216.3**
(3.2) (1.7) (2.7)
Seasonal dummy 5 1 if July–September 41.4** 31.8** 73.5**
(3.7) (4.8) (4.8)
Constant 235.2 261.2** 296.4**
(1.3) (4.8) (2.3)
Number of observations 213 215 213
Adjusted R-square 0.40 0.52 0.51
Notes: *significant at the 10 per cent level, **significant at the 5 per cent level
(also in bold type).
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.
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Dry season cross-sectional demands for household agricultural labor (days/quarter)
Male Female Total
Fuelwood shadow price 1.7 0.9 2.1
(0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
Water shadow price 8.0** 4.1** 12.2**
(2.4) (2.7) (2.9)
Leaf fodder shadow price 211.0* 24.4 215.5*
(1.7) (0.9) (1.65)
Location dummy 5 1 if Chhoprak 215.4 225.3** 240.5**
(1.4) (1.9) (1.9)
Caste dummy 5 1 if Tibeto/Burman 23.0 222.8 226.4
(0.2) (1.4) (1.0)
Upland area 39.9** 47.8** 87.6**
(4.6) (5.2) (5.9)
Lowland area 51.9** 20.3 51.1*
(2.1) (0.03) (1.7)
Bovine livestock 22.4 20.8 23.2
(1.3) (0.5) (1.0)
Altitude 20.02 0.05* 0.03
(0.8) (1.7) (0.7)
Percentage of literate adults 0.001 0.2* 0.2
(0.01) (1.8) (0.8)
Male adults 9.9* 0.07 10.5
(1.7) (0.03) (1.4)
Female adults 2.7 8.7** 11.4
(0.6) (2.0) (1.5)
Youths age 6–15 3.3 4.2 7.7
(1.0) (1.4) (1.3)
Children under age 6 27.4** 22.1 29.5
(2.2) (0.3) (1.2)
Seasonal dummy 5 1 if 47.4** 35.2** 82.8**
October–December (4.3) (4.0) (4.7)
Constant 228.5 273.2** 2102.6*
(1.0) (2.1) (1.8)
Number of observations 167 167 167
Adjusted R-square 0.43 0.46 0.51
Notes: *significant at the 10 per cent level, **significant at the 5 per cent level.
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses.
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Random-effect demands for household agricultural labor, all four quarters (days/year)
Male Female Total
Fuelwood shadow price 0.1 20.2 20.1
(0.07) (0.2) (0.06)
Water shadow price 4.3** 1.9** 6.5**
(3.6) (2.3) (3.6)
Location dummy 5 1 if Chhoprak 27.2 210.4 217.5
(0.6) (1.3) (1.1)
Caste dummy 5 1 if Tibeto/Burman 27.4** 217.7* 226.5
(0.5) (1.7) (1.3)
Upland area 46.4** 50.9** 97.1**
(6.3) (9.2) (9.0)
Lowland area 37.7** 22.0 35.2**
(4.0) (0.2) (2.5)
Bovine livestock 20.8 0.4 20.4
(0.7) (0.5) (0.2)
Altitude 20.01 0.03** 0.02
(0.6) (2.0) (0.6)
Percentage of literate adults 0.03 0.2** 0.2
(0.2) (2.0) (1.2)
Male adults 7.8** 1.2 9.8*
(2.2) (0.4) (1.8)
Female adults 4.5 5.9* 10.9*
(1.0) (1.7) (1.6)
Youths age 6–15 1.3 4.0** 5.5
(0.4) (1.95) (1.3)
Children under age 6 28.4** 24.5* 213.3**
(2.6) (1.9) (2.7)
Seasonal dummy 5 1 if April–June 240.6** 230.3** 271.2**
(4.8) (5.3) (5.5)
Seasonal dummy 5 1 if 20.2 21.4 21.5
October–December (0.02) (0.2) (0.2)
Seasonal dummy 5 1 if 235.6** 226.3** -62.1**
January–February (4.4) (4.7) (5.0)
Constant 10.35 229.9* 221.3
(0.4) (1.8) (0.6)
Number of observations 451 454 451
Overall R-square 0.45 0.51 0.53
Notes: *significant at the 10 per cent level, **significant at the 5 per cent
level.
Absolute z-statistics in parentheses.
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Rainy season random-effect demands for household agricultural labor (days/quarter)
Male Female Total
Fuelwood shadow price 20.6 20.7 21.4
(0.3) (0.5) (0.4)
Water shadow price 4.8** 1.8 6.6**
(2.5) (1.4) (2.3)
Cut grass shadow price 27.7 212.8* 220.8
(0.6) (1.68) (1.2)
Location dummy 5 1 if Chhoprak 20.9 1.6 0.62
(0.06) (0.1) (0.02)
Caste dummy 5 1 if Tibeto/Burman 213.4 222.5* 236.3
(0.7) (1.9) (1.3)
Upland area 49.3** 54.7** 104.2**
(5.3) (8.7) (7.5)
Lowland area 31.3* 210.1 21.0
(2.6) (1.2) (1.2)
Bovine livestock 0.1 1.7 1.9
(0.1) (1.4) (0.7)
Altitude 20.01 0.04** 0.03
(0.2) (1.95) (0.7)
Percentage of literate adults 0.1 0.2** 0.4
(0.5) (2.3) (1.4)
Male adults 6.3 1.0 7.3
(1.1) (0.2) (0.8)
Female adults 3.8 4.2 8.0
(0.6) (1.0) (0.8)
Youths age 6–15 2.0 5.0** 7.1
(0.5) (2.1) (1.3)
Children under age 6 29.9** 26.3** 216.3**
(2.3) (2.1) (2.5)
Seasonal dummy 5 1 if July–September 41.4** 31.8** 73.5**
(4.1) (4.7) (4.9)
Constant 235.2 261.2** 296.4**
(1.1) (2.9) (2.1)
Number of observations 213 215 213
Overall R-square 0.45 0.56 0.55
Notes: *significant at the 10 per cent level, **significant at the 5 per cent level
Absolute z-statistics in parentheses.
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Dry season random-effect demands for household agricultural labor (days/quarter)
Male Female Total
Fuelwood shadow price 1.7 0.9 2.8
(0.3) (0.2) (0.4)
Water shadow price 8.0** 4.1** 12.2**
(4.0) (3.0) (4.1)
Leaf fodder shadow price 211.0 24.4 215.5
(1.0) (0.6) (0.9)
Location dummy 5 1 if Chhoprak 215.4 225.3** 240.5
(0.8) (1.98) (1.4)
Caste dummy 5 1 if Tibeto/Burman 23.0 222.8 226.4
(0.1) (1.5) (0.8)
Upland area 39.9** 47.8** 87.6**
(3.5) (6.2) (5.3)
Lowland area 51.9** 20.3 51.1**
(3.5) (0.03) (2.4)
Bovine livestock 22.4 20.8 23.2
(1.3) (0.6) (1.2)
Altitude 20.02 0.05** 0.03
(0.5) (2.0) (0.6)
Percentage of literate adults 0.001 0.2 0.2
(0.008) (1.4) (0.7)
Male adults 9.9** 0.07 10.4
(2.0) (0.02) (1.5)
Female adults 2.7 8.7* 11.4
(0.4) (1.9) (1.1)
Youths age 6–15 3.3 4.2 7.7
(0.7) (1.3) (1.1)
Children under age 6 27.4 22.1 29.5
(1.4) (0.6) (1.3)
Seasonal dummy 5 1 if 47.4** 35.2** 82.8**
October–December (4.0) (4.3) (4.7)
Constant 228.5 273.2** 2102.6*
(0.7) (2.9) (1.9)
Number of observations 167 167 167
Adjusted R-square 0.49 0.51 0.55
Notes: *significant at the 10 per cent level, **significant at the 5 per cent level
Absolute z-statistics in parentheses
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